Abstract: We develop a model of insider lending in which a borrower can give incentives to a bank manager to misuse his right of control by extending a loan at favorable rates to the borrower at the expense of the equity value of the bank. The model explains why insider loans are often made to borrowing firms that are also large shareholders of the bank. Although in principal every borrower could bribe the bank manager for insider loans, large shareholders have the power to fire the bank manager and will use this power if the manager extends insider loans to others. Therefore, a bank manager has an incentive to favor large shareholders when engaging into insider lending. Using a World Bank survey of Russian enterprises, we provide support for our model. We find t hat Russian firms and banks engaged into insider lending on the basis of loan volume. To limit insider lending, we propose proper incentives for bank managers, such as high penalties or equity incentive schemes.
Introduction
Poor lending policies stand out among the causes of recent banking crises, in particular in countries with poor corporate governance and weak enforcement of regulations and laws. For the case of Russia, this paper focuses on the most common of these lending policies, namely lending to insiders. Russia is of particular interest because ownership links between Russian borrowers and their banks seem to have fostered insider lending. Furthermore, Russia has a weak institutional framework and poor corporate governance.
A bank can extend loans to several types of insiders, including major shareholders, subsidiaries, affiliated companies, directors, executive officers, and members of the board of directors. A potential for abuse exists when insiders receive loans at favorable terms. If the favorable conditions are due to the availability of more information and, therefore, less uncertainty on the borrower, such loans are not a major concern. However, if favorable terms are granted on insider loans relative to similar risky loans to outsiders, and if the bank has allocated a substantial percentage of its loans to such activities, the bank's lending policy should be of concern to the regulator as well as to its shareholders.
Another potential problem with these loans is that insiders might have less incentive than outsiders to repay a loan on time or at all. In some cases, bank managers may simply rollover the bad debts of insiders with whom they have close ties. Thus, we define insider lending as lending to insider parties, that are connected to the bank through ownership or the ability to control, on conditions and volumes that are more favorable than would be economically justified. Insider lending is also known as connected lending because the favorable terms pertain to parties that are connected with each other through control or cash flow rights. Kummer, Arshadi and Lawrence (1989) state that, in a professionally managed bank, in which the managers have negligible ownership, there is an incentive to collude with insider-borrowers to the detriment of both the regulator and the shareholders. This paper shows that, first, even if bank managers have significant ownership there may still be an incentive for the bank manager to collude with insider-borrowers, and, secondly, that even shareholders may want to engage in insider lending practices at the expense of the bank's equity. As a special case, we look at the situation in which principal shareholders of the bank are also potential large borrowers of the same bank. These large shareholders are present on the management board of the bank.
During the Soviet Regime, the Russian banking system consisted of a single, monolithic bank owned by the state. Financial reform in 1987 created three regional banks spun-off from the former state bank. Since the financial reforms in the early 1990s, a large number of private banks, over two thousand by 1993, has been established in Russia. With virtually no shareholding restrictions in place, ownership of these banks tends to be highly concentrated. Because of the freedom to set up and own banks, enterprise shareholding has become widespread.
According to Claessens and Pohl (1995) , ownership in the new private banks is concentrated as the five largest shareholders often control as much as half of the shares.
Ownership of the three spin-off banks is more diversified with the five largest shareholders controlling about 25 percent of the shares. According to a bank survey in 1994, the results of which are presented in Belyanova and Rozinsky (1995) , ownership of new banks is dominated by new private companies, while former state banks are held by state institutions, state enterprises, private enterprises and individuals with each having about 25 percent of the shares. Bank ownership of enterprises is much less widespread, and, since 1994, it has been limited by a banking regulation to 10 percent of the stock of a single company (Akamatsu, 1995 and Litwack, 1995) . Berglöf (1995) states tha t such extensive enterprise ownership of banks in Russia has perpetuated insider lending. The survey in Belyanova and Rozinsky (1995) shows that banks that are owned by enterprises prefer to extend loans to these companies in over 80 percent of cases. Another survey carried out in 1993 and reported in Litwack (1995) also documents a strong preference of banks to finance enterprises that are holding their shares. In some cases, these enterprises accounted for 90 percent of all credits. Insider lending in Russia has saddled the banks with large amounts of overdue debt and observers have argued that such preferential loans need to be drastically reduced (Van Wijnbergen, 1997) .
A contributory factor to the growth of insider lending has been the fact that the interests of members of the board of directors of Russian enterprises are aligned with the interests of the major shareholders of those enterprises. Akamatsu (1995) reports that Russia's company law did not allow outsiders who do not represent the interests of the major shareholders on the board of directors until recently. Another contributory factor to insider lending has been the minimal implementation of bankruptcy law in Russia. Perotti (2000) reports that removing insiders from control has turned out to be almost impossible; the law explicitly excluded banks from its introduction in 1990 until its reform in 1999.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model of insider lending. This model helps to explain why we often observe insider loans going to firms that are also large shareholders of the bank. Section 3 uses Russian firm-level data to test for evidence of insider lending in Russia. The results indicate that Russian firms and banks engaged in insider lending based on differential loan volume. Section 4 proposes ways to limit insider lending and compares the tradeoffs of using one versus the other instrument within the context of Russia. Section 5 concludes.
A Model of Insider Lending
In this section, we model insider lending as a special case in which a bank manager extends loans at subsidized interest rates to a borrower who is willing to return part of the subsidy as a bribe to the bank manager. For simplicity, we neglect the possibilities that loans to insiders may benefit from relationship banking and that insiders might have less incentives than outsiders to repay a loan on time or at all. In the model, every borrower can bribe; however, only the shareholders of the bank, who are potential borrowers, have the power to fire the bank manager. Since the shareholders will use this power if the bank manager extends insider loans to borrowers other than the shareholders themselves, the bank manager has a reason to favor shareholders. Because the power of a single shareholder increases with the voting rights that he owns and with the size of his stake in the bank's share capital, a particular shareholder will have a better opportunity to get insider loans if he has a larger equity stake in the bank. However, it is not obvious that a shareholder finds it in his self-interest to bribe the bank manager for insider loans. The bank shareholder faces a trade-off in that his personal project financed by the bank benefits from the cheaper loan but the value of his equity stake in the bank decreases. If insider lending to a shareholder occurs, his benefit from engaging in insider lending must be larger than his cost. In what follows, we model this trade-off explicitly by following an incentive approach based on Boot and Thakor (1993) .
At t=0, the bank can extend a loan of one dollar to invest in a discretionary asset that requires an investment of one dollar and gives a payoff to the bank of R at t=1. R equals 0 ) ( > θ R with probability θ and 0 with probability 1-θ, with R'(.)<0 and R''(.) ≤ 0.
To simplify, we assume that there is no moral hazard because the bank manager has full information about θ and that there is an unlimited range and amount of projects available to the bank. In effect, this means that the bank manager owns the control right to choose the project to be financed, i.e. that the bank manager can choose θ, which can be considered to be the loan quality. In addition to the one-dollar loan, the bank already owns assets at t=0 that pay off a random amount ỹ at t=1 and nothing thereafter, where ỹ has a distribution F(.) and a probability density f(.) with support [0, y ] and 0 > y . For ease of notation we define the expected value of these assets to be
The bank manager is paid a fixed wage w, regardless of the profits of the bank, and w is set to equal his outside opportunities, u . However, the bank's shareholders can fire the bank manager for not maximizing the bank's profits. Although the bank manager has the same outside opportunities, making him in principle indifferent between any choice of θ, we assume that a bank manager with a fixed wage will choose θ to maximize the profits of the bank. The investment is financed with K dollars of book capital provided by shareholders and with (1-K) dollars of deposits. The bank pays the depositors f r , which equals one plus the riskless rate for simplicity. The amount of capital that a bank can raise is limited. We assume that there is no explicit deposit insurance and that depositors do not exercise market discipline 2 . All parties are assumed to be risk neutral.
The bank is closed at t=1, if R y+ is less than the obligation to the depositors. We assume that f r K y ) 1 ( − < , or that the maximum possible return on the bank's other assets is smaller than the promised payment on its newly acquired liabilities. This assumption implies that the bank defaults on its newly acquired liabilities (1-K) and is thus insolvent whenever the newly financed project fails, i.e. realizes a return of zero.
Consequently, an implicit assumption is that the newly financed project is large relative to the bank's existing assets.
Throughout the paper, we assume that the regulator is prudent, meaning that we are not in a world of self-interested regulators as in Boot and Thakor (1993) . In such a world, insider lending could explode because a bank manager who is bribed by a borrower can simply bribe the regulator in turn for not playing the police officer. Such a recursive game of bribery has been modeled by Basu, Bhattacharya, and Misra (1992) .
If there is no insider lending, there will be no collusion and the bank manager simply maximizes
which gives as the optimal choice for loan quality:
We assume that
, that is, the optimal project makes the bank profitable in the case of success. However, this choice of the project quality is not the social optimum. This would be achieved by an all equity-financed project that solves hazard (Boot and Thakor, 1993) .
We consider the possibility that a borrower may bribe the bank manager in return for an insider loan, i.e., funding a project of sub-optimal quality θ θ< at a rate of ) (θ R .
The gross expected benefit to the borrower will be )} ( . A self-interested bank manager paid only a fixed wage, w, will accept this bribe. The net expected benefit to the borrower is
. As the insider loan is extended, the expected equity value of the bank will increase by only
the shareholders of the bank worse off.
The prudent bank regulator wants to prevent insider lending and will monitor the bank's choice of the combination {θ , ) (θ R }. However, we assume that it is difficult for the regulator to determine whether the chosen combination is optimal because it is easy for the bank manager to hide information on insider lending from the regulator. In this case, the bank regulator observes only ) (θ R , the interest payments on the loan, but not θ, the true risk of the loan, which is observed only by the bank's insiders, i.e., the bank manager and the borrower. We model the monitoring effort of the bank regulator by the parameter η, which is the probability that the regulator spots the inferior loan quality θ. If the regulator finds out that insider lending is occurring, the bank manager will be fired and a fair interest rate ) (θ R will be imposed on the borrower. We ignore the case in which the bank manager can also give insider loans to himself. In most countries, this form of abuse is handled by imposing a strict limit on the loans that the bank manager can give to himself, and by requiring the approval by a majority of the entire board of directors.
In principle, all potential borrowers can bribe the bank manager for a loan on favorable terms. Thus, competition ultimately drives the benefit of bribery to zero.
Knowing this in advance, borrowers who do not own the bank's equity will not bribe.
Borrowers who are also bank shareholders, from now on classified as shareholderborrowers, may still be able to bribe profitably, because they can fire the bank manager for not co-operating. The threat of firing will force the bank manager to accept a smaller bribe from a bank shareholder and make his project yield a positive expected profit. Of course this benefit is at the expense of the expected value of the bank's equity.
A bank shareholder can fire the bank manager with probability ) (α φ for not cooperating where α is the share of the voting rights that this particular shareholder owns.
We assume that φ'(.) >0, φ''(.) and not the true level of θ , when the bank extends a loan to another borrower. We assume that a shareholder learns that the bank manager has extended an insider loan to a borrower other than himself with probability ψ, in which case the bank manager is fired with probability ) (α φ and the borrower has to repay the true ) (θ R . Probability ψ is assumed to be independent of the stake that the particular shareholder has in the bank. For simplicity, we consider only two bank shareholders. is of worse quality than the project funded by a non-bribed bank manager.
Proof: The payoff to the bank manager if he cooperates with a type III borrower is:
, and 1 = III γ due to competition. Hence, the payoff to the bank manager equals his wage plus the bribe times the probability that both the regulator and the shareholders do not discern the spot insider lending. The bank manager will choose θ to maximize (2), which gives the maximum choice for the quality of the insider loan as
and the payoff to the bank manager as:
Proposition 1 established the bribe to the bank manager when the manager receives all of the rents due to competition among bribers. Contrary to non-shareholder borrowers, shareholders are capable of gaining some returns to bribing because they can threaten to fire the manager. The ability to fire the bank manager and, therefore, to bribe successfully increases with the ownership stake. The private benefit that non-shareholder borrowers would provide to the bank manager forms a benchmark for the bribe that the shareholders will have to pay. Proposition 2 establishes the ability of the majority shareholder to bribe the manager and pass on some of the cost to the minority shareholder.
Proposition 2: A majority shareholder can get an insider loan if he gives a certain share of his expected benefit, say * I γ , to the bank manager.
Proof: The maximum payoff to the bank manager from cooperating with a type II
where II γ is the proportion of the loan subsidy that the borrower returns to the bank manager as a bribe. For the bank manager to prefer giving an insider loan to a type II borrower rather than a type III borrower, (4) must be larger than (3) in expected value
terms. This will be the case if
. The majority shareholder needs even a smaller bribe than the minority shareholder. This follows from considering the payoff to the bank manager fo r cooperating with a type I borrower, which is:
where I γ is the proportion of the loan subsidy that the type I borrower pays to the bank manager as a bribe. For the bank manager to prefer giving an insider loan to a type I borrower, expression (5) must be larger than both (3) and (4) in expected value terms.
This holds if:
From (6), it follows that a bribe from the majority shareholder will be preferred by the
The total payoff to the majority shareholder is lower than the net benefit from the insider loan because the value of his share in bank equity is lower due to the insider loan.
Hence, the reduction in the expected value of equity could be larger than the expected gain on the loan. Obviously, the reduction in the expected value of the equity is larger for the majority shareholder than it is for the minority shareholder because the expected loss of the equity value is proportional to the ownership stake, α. Therefore, it could be that the total benefit of bribing is larger for a type II borrower than for a type I borrower, even though a type II borrower has to pay a higher bribe. This is captured by the following proposition.
Proposition 3: There exists a critical level of ownership, denoted * I α , above which the majority shareholder will no t bribe the bank manager to engage into insider lending because the costs in terms of his share of the lost value of bank equity outweighs the benefits. This critical level, Proof: Without any bribing, the expected payoff to the majority shareholder from its ownership stake is
. If the majority shareholder bribes to secure an insider loan, his expected payoff equals the expected payoff from his bank shares plus the expected benefit from the insider loan, or:
In the proof of Proposition 2 we show that a bribe from the majority shareholder will be preferred by the bank manager if
. Thus, the majority shareholder will
Both the numerator and the denominator of the ratio in (7) are positive because
. Whether the inequality holds depends upon the model parameters and on the variables θ ( and θˆ. These will determine whether the majority shareholder will find it in his self-interest to bribe the bank manager. Note that (7) does not depend on the regulator parameter η. Q. E. D.
Proposition 3 establishes a threshold beyond which the majority shareholder's stake can not go if it is to be profitable for this shareholder to bribe the manager. If this critical threshold were to be exceeded, it could be profitable for the minority shareholder to bribe and impose cost on the majority shareholder. Following similar steps as have been used to proof Proposition 3 it can be shown that this is the case if:
However, knowing this in advance, a rational shareholder will not hold a majority stake larger than the critical threshold, * I α , especially given that a stake of 50 percent is typically large enough to exercise control. Therefore, the situation in which the minority shareholder imposes costs on the majority shareholder is hypothetical and can be ignored.
Clearly, a bribe from the majority shareholder is at the expense of the minority shareholder, whose shares decrease in value. Since this can be anticipated, the question arises why any one would become or remain a minor shareholder. One explanation is that the expected rents of the bank are sufficiently high to offer the minority shareholder a competitive rate equal to his outside opportunities even in the presence of insider lending to the majority shareholder. Another explanation is that the minority shareholder is simply an uninformed agent. One obvious candidate for this type of owner is the government, which often takes passive, minority stakes in banks. Competition for the majority ownership of a bank during a privatization process offers a third explanation.
The shareholders that loose the competition become minority shareholders and face the risk of being exploited by the majority shareholder. This explains why such minority shareholders are likely to remain minority shareholders. Although they may want to sell their minority stakes, it will be hard to find informed buyers if majority shareholders abuse their position and protection of minority shareholder rights is poor. In addition to an inefficient allocation of credit, such abuse of concentrated bank ownership makes poor candidates for corporate governance.
Empirical Evidence of Insider Lending in Russia
In mid-1994, the World Bank conducted a survey of the top management of 439 Russian industrial enterprises employing 15 or more persons. This survey provides excellent data to analyze the relations between firms, banks and credit in Russia from the perspective of firms. The majority of the enterprises selected are privately owned (26% state-owned, 64% privatized, and 11% private companies). The sample was drawn from the Goskomstat database, which comprises 23,000 enterprises, and from lists at local statistical offices. For more details of the survey, refer to the appendix in Commander, Fan, and Schaffer (1996) .
The data from the World Bank survey has already been used by Fan, Lee, and Schaffer (1996) to analyze the relations between firms, banks and credit in Russia. They find that being a major shareholder of a bank is not correlated significantly with obtaining bank credit with greater ease. This lack of effective influence is also reflected i n the volume of borrowings and in the interest rates paid. Shareholders do not have larger bank loans compared to non-shareholders, nor do they receive more favorable repayment terms. On the basis of these results, Fan, Lee, and Schaffer (1996) conclude that, although the number of enterprises that hold shares in banks is significant, there is no apparent impact of such shareholding on credit allocation. As we argue in the next section, their findings are partly the result of estimating an equation with a single independent variable and not controlling for firm-specific factors.
With respect to ownership, the firms in the sample have the following characteristics. First, managers have a large ownership stake in their firms; in 76% of firms, managers own 5% or more of the shares and, in 17% of firms, they own 50% or more of the shares. Second, manager shareholders have a dominant influence on decisions regarding financial issues in 68% of firms that have shareholder managers.
Third, managers are often on the board of directors as is the case in 85% of firms. Fourth, firms are often shareholders in the bank that grants their loans; in 46% of firms that have loans outstanding, the firm is a shareholder in the bank that has granted its largest loan and, in 13% of firms, the firm is even a major shareholder. Fifth, banks are almost never shareholders in the firms to which they grant loans; in only 4% of firms is the bank a shareholder and in only 0.5% of the cases is the bank a major shareholder.
With respect to financing, the firms in the sample have the following characteristics. First, firms find it difficult to get long-term loans from a bank on commercial terms; in 75% of cases, the firms find it fairly difficult to impossible to get long-term bank loans. Second, firms find it easy to get short-term loans from a bank on commercial terms; in 69% of cases, the firms find it fairly easy to very easy to get shortterm bank loans. Third, many companies have payment problems; 57% of firms have failed to repay a bank loan or make an interest payment on time at least once in the past two years. Fourth, a large number of companies does not have bank credit outstanding as is the case in 40% of firms. Fifth, commercial banks are the main source of loans; in 73% of the cases, a commercial bank is the source of the largest loan outstanding while the other sources are other firms, the Central Bank of Russia, or the government. Sixth, some credit extended by commercial banks is not on commercial terms, i.e., the interest rate is below the Central Bank of Russia discount rate.
Loans may be on preferential terms with respect to either the interest rate or the size. In the model, we define insider lending as extending a loan of sub-optimal quality, θ θ< , at a rate of ) (θ R . Although the model focuses on the quality of the loan, interest and size can be incorporated as follows. Since the fair rate on a loan of sub-optimal quality θ should be ) (θ R , which is higher than ) (θ R , the interest rate has been set too low. Thus, insider lending can be interpreted as lending with an interest discount. The model considers a loan of one dollar with an optimal quality, θˆ. A loan larger than one dollar is likely to be of lower quality than θˆ, that is of higher risk other things equal.
Therefore, if a loan larger than one dollar were to be extended at a rate of ) (θ R , this would represent a loan of sub-optimal quality, θ . Hence, insider lending can be interpreted as lending with size preference as well. From Propositions 1 through 3, majority bank shareholders should receive loans from their banks of either larger size or lower interest rates than others in return for a bribe so long as the shareholding does not exceed the critical level identified in Proposition 3. For most firms, the majority shareholder is not expected to exceed this critical level given that the typical majority stake in Russian banks for the sample of firms is 50 percent. Given that the minority shareholder could bribe successfully and impose cost on the majority shareholder if this critical threshold were to be exceeded it is no surprise that the stake of the largest shareholder is not far from 50 percent in Russia.
In this section, we test for evidence of insider lending. Before doing so, we analyze whether relationship banking was prevalent in Russia around 1994. In our model, we neglect the possibility that granting loans to insiders allows rents from relationship banking. Rather, we focus on the dark side of insider lending, namely the fraudulent behavior of granting loans on favorable terms. The conclusions of the model may not hold if benefits to rela tionship banking are prevalent.
Lending to insiders may mitigate certain informational asymmetries between the lender and the borrower.
5 Such benefits may be large for ownership links between the bank and its borrowers. The presence of borrowing firms on the management board of the bank may give the bank manager access to more information on these firms and improve the quality of loans made to those insiders. Potentially, they may also provide more information on other firms in the same industry. If informational asymmetries between banks and their borrowers are lower for certain clients, the bank may find it profitable to extend loans on preferential terms to these clients. Such clients might include firms that are owned by the bank, firms that own shares in the bank, and firms that have significant debt outstanding with the bank.
Since firm ownership by banks was not common in Russia in 1994, only 0.4% of firms in our data set had a bank as its majority shareholder, the first type of informational link between banks and their clients can be neglected. 6 To assess the importance of the other two linkages, we investigate whether it is easier for shareholders and large borrowers to get credit on a commercial basis, i.e., on fair terms and without bribes. If relationship banking is prevalent, this should be the case. As a proxy for large borrowers,
we use the amount of credit outstanding to sales. As an indicator for bank ownership, we use a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm is a majority shareho lder in a bank and zero otherwise. The data enable us to distinguish between financing constraints with respect to long-term and short-term loans. The survey has classified ease of obtaining credit into 5 categories. The financing constraint variable takes a value of zero if it is very easy, one if it is fairly easy, two if it is fairly difficult, three if it is very difficult, and finally four if it is impossible to obtain credit on a commercial basis.
We follow Pinto and Van Wijnbergen (1994) by using an ordered logit procedure to estimate the ease of obtaining credit on a commercial basis as a function of the amount of credit to sales, bank ownership, and some control variables. As control variables, we include the firm's profit to sales, a dummy variable indicating if the firm had credit repayment problems during the past two years, a private ownership dummy, and industry dummies. We expect that it is easier for firms that are profitable and that have had few credit repayment problems in the past to obtain credit because the risk of non-repayment is perceived to be lower for these firms. We include a private ownership dummy to control for potential differences in the ease of obtaining bank credit between state and private enterprises. In general, government-owned enterprises tend to get higher government subsidies, which improve unfairly their financial situation, and therefore they may find it easier to obtain bank credit. State-owned enterprises in transition economies have another advantage over private firms. As Perotti (1993) argues, after the financial reform, Russian banks may have been inclined to give more funds to their loss-making former debtors, which are state-owned enterprises, to improve the probability of repayment of previous debt. We specify the same model for the severity of both the longterm borrowing constraint and the short-term borrowing constraint. The estimation results for the two models are found in Table 1 ; the standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
The sample for the regressions in Table 1 includes firms with and without bank loans. Of the 439 firms originally surveyed, only 386 firms answered the question on the difficulty of obtaining either a long-term or a short-term bank loan on commercial terms.
Of these, only 240 firms provided information on their profitability. The sample used in the regression is reduced to 161 observations because another 79 firms did not answer questions related to some of the other regressors.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Firms that own majority stakes in banks do not find it significantly easier or more difficult to get either long-term or short-term loans on commercial basis. The regression coefficients, although not statistically significant, even indicate that such shareholders find it more difficult to get loans on commercial basis. This suggests that the information asymmetries between banks and their shareholders are not different from those with other bank clients. Hence, it is unlikely that Russian banks and their shareholders were engaged into productive relationship banking in the first half of 1994. Firms that have been major borrowers of banks do not find it significantly easier to obtain more credit on commercial terms. This finding suggests again that there is no indication of benefits to relationship banking. Firms with repayment problems over the last two years find it substantially more difficult to get loans, especially long-term loans. In addition, firms with high current profits find it easier to get short-term loans. However, current profitability does not affect significantly the ease of obtaining long-term financing. In short, the results in Table 1 indicate that it is not easier for either majority shareholders or large borrowers to obtain loans on commercial terms. Therefore, we conclude that relationship banking is not an important feature of Russian banking during our period of study. We use 1994 data 7 only to avoid problems that may arise from using time series data, such as a changes in inflation 8 and changes in the aggregate supply of and demand for credit. We correct for certain firm-specific factors. First, we correct for the amount of other credit outstanding scaled by sales, since banks may extend more credit to firms that already have a large amount of outstanding credit because lending relationships may reduce information asymmetries. Second, we add profits to sales to control for the debt repayment capacity of the firm. Third, we include a dummy variable to indicate if the firm had credit repayment problems during the past two years. Fourth, we add a private ownership dummy variable to correct for differences in the ability to obtain loans by state and private enterprises.
Ordered Least Squares (OLS) estimation of the above regression model may suffer from a potential sample selection problem, in which case the estimates are inconsistent from a statistical point of view because the sample of borrowers may not be a random sample of the population of potential borrowers. 9 The traditional model to deal with sample selection problems is the tobit II model 10 , which is typically estimated using a two-step procedure introduced by Heckman (1979 We use Heckman's two-step procedure to estimate the effect of bank ownership on loan size. As the dependent va riable of the first-step selection equation, we use a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm has borrowed loans from banks and zero if the firm is not a borrower. The sample used for estimating the selection equation includes all firms that indicated whether they are borrowers or not, which amounts to 232 firms out of the total number of 439 firms surveyed. As non-borrower specific explanatory variables, we include profits to sales, a private ownership dummy variable, and industry dummies. These variables are thought to affect the likelihood of borrowing. We estimate the selection equation using a probit model and use its regression output to calculate
Heckman's lambda. The estimation results of the selection model are presented in column a of Table 2 . We find that private firms are more likely to be borrowers, although the power of the regression is weak. In fact, a likelihood model specification test rejects the model at a 45% level. This suggests that the sample of borrowers does not suffer from major selection bias.
11
As a second-step we add the lambda variable to the original regression model to explain loan size. We estimate the second-stage regression by OLS using data on both Companies that are a majority shareholder in the bank granting the largest loan obtain a significantly larger amount of credit. Given the previous result from Table 1 that there is no indication of relationship banking, this form of preferential lending can be interpreted as insider lending. This result is consistent with the prediction of our model that majority shareholders are in a better position to bribe a bank manager to get loans on favorable terms at the expense of the minority shareholder. Borrowers that are profitable, that did not have repayment problems, and that put up significant collateral find it easier to obtain large new loans. Apparently, such borrowers are thought to be more creditworthy. We do not find that large borrowers find it easier to get large new loans from the same bank. This finding is consistent with the previous result from Table 1 that relationship banking was unlikely to be prevalent in Russia by the first half of 1994.
The t-statistic on the coefficient for the estimate of lambda indicates that there is no significant sample selection problem, although the implied correlation coefficient between the two equations' error terms is high at 0.37. The positive correlation coefficient indicates the existence of unobserved characteristics that affect positively both the decision to borrow and the size of the loan. However, this is apparently measured with so much error that it is not significantly different from zero. This finding is not surprising given the weak power of the first-step regression model.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Next, we investigate whether shareholders pay lower interest rates. We must control for a potential sample selection problem so that we again estimate a tobit II model using the two-step procedure. The selection equation is identical to the one used in the previous analysis and the probit estimation results can be found in column a of Table 2 .
The sample of borrowers used in the second-stage regression is 51 because, although 83 firms reported the interest rate on their largest loan, only 51 firms reported the size of their largest loan. The second-stage regression specifies the interest rate on the largest bank loan as a function of the size of the loan, the collateral of the loan, profits to sales, payment problems during the last two years, the amount of other credit outstanding, the maturity of the loan, a private ownership dummy, a dummy variable that indicates whether the firm is a majority shareholder in the bank granting the loan, and Heckman's lambda to control for potential sample selection bias.
We include the first six variables to control for the risk of the loan. Only for the first four variables do we have an a priori expectation of the sign of the coefficients. An increase in collateral or profits to sales, as well as a decrease in the loan size, is expected to improve the repayment capacity of the firm and, hence, to decrease the interest rate charged by the bank. On the other hand, past loan repayment problems are expected to be a good predictor of current payment problems and, therefore, are likely to increase the interest rate charged by the bank. The sign of the coefficients on the amount of other credit outstanding as well as the maturity of the loan is not clear. In general, interest rates would be higher on loans with a longer maturity and for companies with a larger amount of loans because of the increased riskiness of the loan. However, in Russia, there is an overall shortage of credit so that companies that are able to get a large amount of loans or loans at high maturity might be perceived to be less risky by the banks and hence obtain a lower interest rate.
We estimate the second-stage model using OLS and correct the standard errors for heteroskedasticity and estimation error in Heckman's lambda. The estimation results are presented in column c of Table 2 . Since the riskiness of firms might differ across industries, leading banks to require different interest rates on loans for different industries, we estimate the model with industry dummies as well. In both cases, we do not find any evidence of any favorable interest rate treatment towards companies that own banks. The inclusion of industry dummies indicates that there are no significant industry-specific effects. Therefore, we report only the results without industry dummies.
We find weak evidence that firms with repayment problems during the last two years have to pay higher interest rates on new loans, although a Wald model specification test rejects the model at a 39% level.
From these results, we conclude that Russian firms and banks engaged in insider lending on the basis of loan volume rather than preferential interest rates. Perhaps it is easier to hide fraudulent lending behavior if banks adjust the loan volume rather than the interest rate. Another explanation is that many insider loans might not get repaid and are rolled over. The interest rate on such a loan does not matter, since repayment does not take place. In the credit constrained environment of Russia, insiders seem to have used their powers primarily to get large loans and the pricing of loans was secondary. The data provides some empirical evidence for a relationship between non-repayment of loans and bank ownership. Although many firms did not meet their loan payment obligations in the past two years fully, i.e., 57% of the total sample, non-repayment was significantly higher among firms that are shareholders of banks at 71%.
Preventing Insider Lending
In countries with poor banking regulation and a weak legal framework, bankers can easily hide insider lending abuse from the regulator and the shareholders, i.e., the probability of detection, η, is low. Although most countries have regulations in place to prevent such lending practices, such as a restriction on the amount the bank can lend to one party or to insiders, these will only limit the amount of such bad lending practice, not prevent it. Indeed, these restrictions may not be effective at all if it is easy for the bank to circumvent them without being caught by the regulator. In this section, we propose two potential contracts to limit insider lending, namely, a penalty contract and an equity incentive scheme. The first contract allows the regulator to impose a very high penalty on the bank manager if insider lending is detected. The second contract provides the bank manager with a payoff that is linked to the value of the bank's equity.
Using well-known results from the incentive literature it is straightforward to show that there exists a penalty high enough that, if imposed on the bank manager, will prevent the bank manager from engaging in insider lending. Intuitively, it is not worth for a bank manager to engage in insider lending if the punishment is extremely large, even if the chance of such a punishment occurring is low. Of course, the penalty solution presumes enforceability of the penalty contract.
We now consider an equity incentive scheme that induces the bank manager to maximize the shareholder value of the bank and explore its effectiveness. An example of such a scheme in our model would be to pay to the manager the amount
, with ξ small. This sharing scheme will lower the incentive problem due to the separation of ownership (shareholders) and control (bank manager) by providing the self-interested bank manager with an incentive to maximize the shareholder value. Since ξ is small, this motivation is almost costless to the shareholders. Such incentive schemes have been well documented in the literature, for example in Hart (1993) . The following proposition states the effect of an equity incentive scheme on insider lending as defined here.
Proposition 4: An equity incentive scheme will improve the quality of the insider loan, say to ξ θ ( , although it can not prevent the quality of the insider loan being lower than the quality of a normal loan. In effect, this means that an equity incentive scheme can only mitigate, but not prevent insider lending.
Proof: If the regulator uses an equity incentive scheme, that promises a share, ξ, of the value of the bank's equity, the bank manager maximizes:
the solution to which is:
Without the equity incentive scheme, the bank manager chooses
Without insider lending the bank manager chooses which means that an equity incentive scheme does not prevent insider lending, but that it does increase the quality of the insider loan and, thereby, reduces the risk taking of the bank manager.
Q. E. D.
Whether insider lending can be mitigated more effectively by rewarding rather than penalizing bank managers is a difficult question to answer. In the Russian environment the merits of penalties probably outweigh the m erits of rewards. First, although the effectiveness of both instruments suffers from the poor enforcement of contracts in Russia, it is probably easier for the regulator to enforce the penalty contract than it is for the bank manager to enforce the equity incentive scheme because for the penalty contract to be enforceable it is sufficient to verify that the loan quality differs from the optimal level, while for the equity incentive scheme to be enforceable it is necessary to verify how much the loan quality differs from the optimal level. Also, the regulator being a government institution may have more power to enforce contracts. Second, the model shows that a penalty contract, if enforced, will prevent insider lending, while an equity incentive scheme can a t best mitigate insider lending. Third, share value may be determined by things other than managerial behavior in Russia. In an environment in which bank share value is tied only loosely to managerial behavior, an equity incentive scheme is less effective. Also, an equity incentive scheme is less effective if the bank makes losses. Of course, a penalty contract and an equity incentive scheme are not mutually exclusive contracts and may well be used as a package.
Conclusions
The freedom to set up and own banks during the early stage of financial reform in the early 1990s has resulted in extensive enterprise ownership of banks in Russia.
Observers have argued that such ownership concentration has perpetuated insider lending. To increase our understanding of the situation in Russia at the time we develop a model of insider lending in which a borrower provides incentives to a bank manager to misuse his right of control by extending a loan at favorable rates at the expense of the equity value of the bank. This model helps to explain why in Russia at the time insider loans were going to firms that are also large shareholders of the bank. Although in principle every borrower can bribe the bank manager, large shareholders have the power to fire the bank manager and will use this power if the bank manager extends insider loans to others. Therefore, a bank manager favors large shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders, whose equity in the bank decreases in value, and the depositors, because of the increased possibility that the bank will fail. The model also helps to explain why the stake of the largest bank shareholder is typically not far from 50 percent in Russia. There exists a threshold beyond which the majority shareholder's stake can not go if it is to be profitable for this shareholder to bribe the manager. At a 50 percent shareholding, the benefit of the insider loan is likely to outweigh the loss of the equity value because this loss is shared with the minority shareholder(s).
Using a World Bank firm-level survey conducted in mid-1994 we find evidence that Russian firms and banks engaged in insider lending based on differential loan volume. Although we find that majority shareholders of banks obtain loans on preferential volume terms, we do not find evidence of insider lending based on interest rates. It may be easier for the manager to hide fraudulent lending from outsiders by adjusting the volume of the loan rather than the interest rate, especially in Russia where the regulator lacks the capacity to assess whether the volume is adjusted but can easily assess whether the interest rate deviates from the market rate.
An obvious question to ask is why Russia has allowed large shareholders in control of large firms to sit on the management board of banks. The bank regulator could limit insider lending by forbidding shareholders with outside links a position on the management board of banks. In addition to political reasons, these shareholders may have superior knowledge about particular industries tha t would make monitoring normal loans more efficient. In our model, these shareholders could help the bank manager assess loan quality. Hence, the regulator faces a trade-off between having more experience on board or more insider lending.
Although Russia has regulations in place to limit the exposure of banks to related parties, these rules remain largely ineffective because the regulators are unable to enforce them, either because of lack of information or due to imprudent behavior. We propose to limit insider lending by either penalizing bank managers when it is discovered or by using an equity incentive scheme to reward them. Both proposals are relatively cheap and easy to implement. However, we do acknowledge that such instruments may not be effective i n countries like Russia because enforcement of contracts is poor and managerial behavior may not be linked strongly to the value of shares.
Since mid-1994, the time that the Russian enterprise survey was conducted, the ownership structure of Russian firms has changed dramatically. Government ownership of firms has decreased and an increasing number of firms have become controlled by financial institutions, including banks and investment funds. A particular new development has been the emergence of business groups that are dominated by a financial institution, the so-called financial-industrial group (FIG) . The companies in these groups are tied together by cross-shareholdings, and the financial institution has a controlling stake in most member firms. These FIGs emerged from the privatization process in 1993-95 when new Russian banks took major shareholdings in Russian industrial firms, mostly through loan-for-share deals (Perotti and Gelfer, 1999) .
The growing tendency for Russian banks to have controlling stakes in industrial firms may have changed the incentives for these banks to engage in insider lending. It is expected that these banks are more likely to provide financial support for the industrial firms that they control, especially if these industrial firms belong to the same FIG.
Whether the extent of insider lending in Russia has increased or not with the emergence of FIGs is ultimately an empirical question that we are unable to answer at this point due to the lack of data.
The results in this paper are not unique to Russia but can be generalized to other countries with poor corporate governance and weak enforcement of regulations and laws.
They improve our understanding of the reasons for the existence of extensive insider lending in such countries and of the challenges that these countries face in preventing insider lending. Bank regulation to limit the exposure of banks to related parties is not sufficient. Bank managers and regulators should be given incentives to limit imprudent behavior, public information on firms and banks should become widely available at low cost, minority shareholder rights should be protected, and the enforceability of contracts should be improved. 4 Obviously, if the bank has only a single shareholder, insider lending will not occur because it is not in his self-interest to bribe the bank manger if he can not share the loss of the equity value of the bank with other shareholders. 5 Lending to insiders can have distinct advantages if the formal financial system is underdeveloped and the availability of both information and capital are scarce. One example is lending to related group firms. Perotti and Gelfer (1999) study financialindustrial groups in Russia during 1995 to 1996 when they were established to engage in informal lending arrangements among group members. These authors find that financial-
